Chapter 1: Why Inquiry
I. Original Text
In philosophy, “being” refers only to the sum of objects in perception.
[It is generally believed that being or being is an abstract concept of existents or beings, which is a grave mistake. Because, fundamentally, it is not that beings constitute being, but that being differentiates into beings. Objects are not necessarily individual; the most primitive objects, to the primitive subject, must be homogeneous and undifferentiated, that is, they appear directly as being, not as differentiated forms of beings. The concept of being is not derived through profound abstraction from many beings, but is a priori sediment in the deep unconscious foundation of consciousness. Therefore, ordinary subjects usually do not feel wonder at universal being, but rather often feel wonder at individual beings. Heidegger was right in saying that being cannot be derived from beings, but because he did not understand how being differentiates into beings, his concepts of “Dasein” and its “luminous presence” inevitably fell into an inexplicable dark background.]
Since what “perception” is remains questionable, whether objects and the sum of objects are equivalent to existents and natural being is also questionable. In other words, once being is questioned, “being” has already become the subjective being in the questioner’s perception.
Therefore, it is not wrong that traditional philosophy has generally been encompassed within metaphysics. Thus, broadly speaking, studying being in perception as the sum of objects is natural philosophy, while reflecting on being in perception as the sum of perceptions is logic. Although these two disciplines are entirely different, they study two aspects of the same thing.
In view of this, it is immediately meaningless to distinguish whether being is within the subjective or outside the subjective, because there is no difference or variation between being after distinction and being before distinction; after all, you can only face this one kind of being no matter what.
Moreover, more importantly, such distinction is temporarily impossible to undertake.
What is surprising is that existence simply exists, why question it? Clearly, there must be a reason why we must ask.
That is to say, before the philosophical wonder and questioning of “being” occurs, there is first the question of why wonder and why question. [Aristotle once said: “Throughout history, people begin philosophical exploration due to wonder at natural phenomena.” (quoted from ‘Metaphysics’) But precisely because everything starts from this wonder, wonder itself is no longer wondered at.]
Therefore, philosophy’s first question or the potential question before questioning should be: why does the questioner, as an existent, inquire about being?
II. Interpretation
Note: being is used interchangeably with existence in this article.
The core of this passage lies in re-examining the philosophical definition of “being” and exploring why humans raise philosophical questions about “being” itself.
1. Being is not abstracted from individual objects, but is a priori and directly manifested
Traditional views consider “being” as an abstract summary of “existents” (individual objects), but the author criticizes this view, arguing that:
It is not that existents constitute being, but that being differentiates into existents.
The most primitive being is undifferentiated and homogeneous, directly presenting itself to consciousness, rather than being a conclusion drawn through abstraction.
For example, a primitive perceiving subject (like an infant or pre-conceptualized consciousness) first perceives some kind of holistic being, rather than individually differentiated things.
2. Being is an a priori foundation of consciousness, not an empirical summary
We usually don’t wonder at “being” itself, but rather at “existents” (i.e., curious about the particularity of individual things).
For example:
When we see a strange rock, we wonder at its shape or color, not at the fact that “the rock exists.”
Heidegger was right to emphasize that “being cannot be derived from existents,” meaning being is not derived through analyzing things, but is a prerequisite for everything.
3. The question of perception: Is existence the sum of objects or the sum of perceptions?
Since the nature of perception itself remains unclear, we cannot determine whether:
Existence equals the sum of objects (all perceived things).
Or equals the sum of perceptions (all perceptual activities themselves).
This distinguishes two research paths:
Natural philosophy: studying being in perception as the sum of objects.
Logic: studying being in perception as the sum of perceptions.
These two, though seemingly different, are two aspects of the same issue.
4. The distinction between subjective and objective is unimportant
Discussing whether “being is within or outside the subjective” is meaningless:
Because regardless, we can only face this one kind of being, which doesn’t change due to our distinctions.
For example:
“Is this table objective being?” This question itself is already consciousness thinking, even if it’s subjective, we still must face it.
5. Why do we raise philosophical questions about “being”?
Surprisingly, why do we ask what “being” is?
Behind this lies a deeper question: why does “being” itself become a question?
Aristotle believed philosophy originates from wonder at the world, but precisely because wonder is philosophy’s starting point, people don’t wonder at wonder itself.
That is, philosophy’s first question is not what “existence” is, but:
“Why do we, as existents, inquire about existence?”
Summary
Being is not abstracted from individual things but is a priori and directly manifested.
Being in perception can be viewed as both the sum of objects (natural philosophy) and the sum of perceptions (logic).
The subjective vs. objective discussion is meaningless, as we can only face “being” regardless.
The real philosophical question is not “what is being,” but “why do we inquire about being?” The chapter’s core is about clarifying “how being is cognized” and raising a deeper philosophical question: “why do we wonder about being?”
III. What’s Profound?
The profundity of this discussion lies in how it overturns our understanding of the fundamental concept of “being” and raises a more primordial philosophical question: “Why do we question being?” Its profundity is reflected in several aspects:
Redefining “being”—not inductively derived, but primordial
Traditional philosophy generally considers “being” as an abstract summary of “existents” (concrete things), but this book proposes:
“Being” precedes “existents,” not derived from individual things, but directly manifested.
For example, when an infant first faces the world, what they perceive is not differentiated things like “table” or “chair,” but a continuous, undifferentiated existence background.
This challenges our habitual way of thinking:
We always think we “induce” the concept of “existence” from numerous things, but the author points out:
“Being” is transcendentally deposited in the depths of consciousness, individual things are merely results of “being” differentiation. ➡️ Profundity: This echoes Heidegger’s “ontological difference,” overturning empiricist thinking, emphasizing that “being” is not a simple collection of perceptual objects, but a more fundamental “background” or “foundation.”
Epistemological reflection—what exactly is existence in perceptions?
The author introduces a key question:
Is “being” the sum of objects, or the sum of perceptions?
This forces us to rethink the nature of “perception”:
If “being” is the sum of all objects, then the world is objective, and our perceptions merely receive it.
But if “existence” is the sum of all perceptions, then the world is subjective, and our perceptions determine everything.
This actually involves:
natural philosophy (studying objects in perceptions) vs. logic (studying perceptions themselves).
However, the boundary between these two is unclear, because we can never escape our own perceptions to verify “pure objective existence.” ➡️ Profundity: This shakes our confidence in reality—can we really be certain that the world exists objectively, or is it merely constructed by our perceptions?
Ultimate philosophical question—why do we question “being”?
Most powerfully, the author doesn’t stop at the classic question of “what is being?” but asks why humans wonder about being:
“Being is just there, why question it unnecessarily?”
This question is profound because:
Human philosophical thinking isn’t because “existence” is strange, but because we instinctively feel we should think about it.
This means philosophy’s starting point isn’t “discovering problems,” but “why does this problem become a problem?”
Aristotle said “philosophy begins in wonder,” but the author further points out:
We’re used to distilling philosophical questions from wonder, but why don’t we wonder at “wonder itself”?
In other words, the first philosophical question isn’t what “existence” is, but:
“Why do we, as existents, inquire about being?” ➡️ Profundity: This is a reflection beyond traditional philosophy, making us realize that human thinking itself is a mechanism of “passive questioning,” and we usually don’t question the rationality of this mechanism.
The ultimate meaninglessness of “subjective vs. objective”
Traditional philosophy tries to distinguish between subjective and objective, attempting to answer:
“Is existence within or outside the subjective?”
But the author believes this distinction is meaningless because:
However we define it, existence is always there, unchanged by our conceptualization.
This reminds one of:
Descartes’ “I think therefore I am”
And modern physics’ observer effect (our measurement method affects how reality presents itself).
The profundity here lies in:
Any definition of “existence” is a product within human consciousness’s framework.
Whether we define it as objective or subjective, we cannot escape this “framework,” meaning:
being is the being you face, and you cannot jump out of this cognitive system to verify its “reality.” ➡️ Profundity: This makes us realize that “objective being” might just be a limitation of human consciousness, and we can never transcend this limitation to explore “true being.”
Summary: The profundity of this chapter lies in—
1. Redefining “being”:
Not an empirical summary, but a priori primordial manifestation.
2. Challenging our epistemology:
Is being the sum of perceptions or objects? We can’t even distinguish.
3. Pushing philosophical questions to a deeper level:
Philosophy’s fundamental question isn’t “what is existence,” but “why do we question existence.”
This reveals philosophy’s inherent mechanism, which we usually don’t reflect upon.
4. Dissolving the boundary between subjective and objective:
However we define “existence,” we can never escape our cognitive system.
➡️ Ultimately, philosophy isn’t about solving problems, but making us realize why we raise these questions.
IV. What are the criticisms?
While this discussion presents a unique philosophical perspective and profundity, it can be critiqued from several aspects:
1. The argument “existence precedes existents” lacks empirical support
The article emphasizes that “existence” isn’t abstracted from individual things (existents), but is primordially manifested, homogeneous whole.
But this view lacks empirical evidence and seems more like a metaphysical assumption:
In reality, our cognition of the world always starts with specific objects, like babies first recognizing mother’s face and voice, not an “undifferentiated existence.”
Cognitive science shows that human perception of the world is essentially categorizing and distinguishing, not first perceiving “existence” then differentiating.
This assertion overemphasizes a priori nature while neglecting experience’s role in shaping existence perception.
✅ Critical point: Human cognition of the world is experience-based, distinguishing things is a natural cognitive process, not a result of later differentiation.
2. Existence in perceptions vs. sum of perceptions: The dichotomy might be a pseudo-problem
The article proposes that being can be understood as:
sum of objects (natural philosophy)
sum of perceptions (logic)
But this distinction itself might be a pseudo-problem:
Modern neuroscience shows the boundary between perceptions and objects is blurry; perceptions don’t passively receive the world but actively construct it.
For example: Color doesn’t exist in the physical world but is the brain’s processing product of light waves. If perceptions can change “how objects exist,” are they really completely opposing understandings?
This shows the author’s dichotomy neglects modern science’s epistemological perspective that perceptions and existence aren’t independent entities but intertwined dynamic relationships.
✅ Critical point: The dualism of perceptions and objects might be an illusion created by human language, not an actual ontological distinction.
3. The “subjective vs. objective” problem isn’t truly resolved
The article argues discussing whether “existence is within or outside the subjective” is meaningless because we can only face the same existence regardless.
But this assertion doesn’t really solve the subjective-objective problem, it merely avoids it:
Modern philosophy, especially epistemology since Kant, has been trying to understand how humans know the world and whether the world exists independently of human cognition.
If we accept the view that “subjective-objective distinction is meaningless,” does that mean the question “does the world exist independently of our cognition” is also meaningless? If so, how does science operate?
In fact, quantum physics’ measurement problems (like Schrödinger’s cat, observer effect) all show subjective-objective relationship remains an important philosophical and scientific issue, not a pseudo-problem easily ignored.
✅ Critical point: The subjective-objective discussion can’t be simply negated, otherwise we can’t explain how scientific research establishes consensus on “existence.”
4. Is the question “why question being?” over-mystified?
The author proposes that the real question worth exploring is:
Why do humans question being?
But this question itself might be a language game:
Human wonder about “existence” might just be a product of language and thought structure, not questions arising from the universe itself.
Wittgenstein pointed out many philosophical problems stem from language misleading us, like “what is time?” “what is meaning?” These questions might not be meaningful questions at all, but illusions created by language structure.
If we acknowledge “why question being” is also a language trap, then it perhaps shouldn’t be philosophy’s first question.
✅ Critical point: “Why question being” might just be a product of language and thinking patterns, not a real philosophical problem.
5. Neglects scientific methods’ challenge to “existence”
Modern physics, cognitive science, and mathematical philosophy have posed new challenges to the concept of “existence”:
Physics: Quantum mechanics suggests “existence” might be probabilistic, not absolute.
Cognitive science: Human perception of “existence” is an evolutionary product, not metaphysical ontology.
Mathematical philosophy: Research in mathematical logic and set theory shows “existence” isn’t always intuitive, like paradoxes of infinite sets and Gödel’s incompleteness theorems challenge traditional ontology.
These all indicate that discussing “being” purely philosophically might lag behind scientific exploration.
✅ Critical point: Modern science has provided more precise descriptions of “being,” while philosophy remains in abstract conceptual discussion, possibly needing updated perspectives.
Summary: Critique of Chapter One
Chapter One proposes a novel “existence theory,” but:
Its core argument (“existence precedes existents”) lacks cognitive science support.
The perceptions vs. objects dichotomy might be an artificially created philosophical problem.
The subjective-objective problem can’t be simply ignored, otherwise science couldn’t operate.
“Why question being” might be a language trap, not a real philosophical problem.
Modern science provides new “being” explanations, philosophy needs dialogue with it rather than independent discussion.
🚀 Finally, while this discussion has philosophical innovation, its excessive exclusion of empirical science, language philosophy, and modern physics might cause its “being theory” to lose practical support.
V. Author’s Review (Handwritten by Jinspire)
The criticisms are basically invalid. Various scientific support appears in subsequent chapters.
“Modern science has provided more precise descriptions of ‘existence’” -> Obviously not, this is a hallucination of LLM, as the author prompts to force a critique.
Amazingly, long after Professor Dongyue published, many events had already transformed from prophecies into reality.
This article profoundly interprets “existence precedes essence” and “I think therefore I am,” and continues thinking and questioning beyond these foundations.
So, “why does us, the questioner, as an being, inquire about being?”
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